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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE N. ANDERSON and Wife 
IMOGENE T. ANDERSON, 
LORENZO W. ANDERSON heretofore 
known as LORENZO W. ANDERSON, Jr. 
and Wife HAZEL M. ANDERSOS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MARIE T. JOHNSON and 
CHESTER N. JOHNSON, 
Defendants and Appellants 
RES.PONDENTS' BRIEF 
PRELil\tiiN ARY STATEMENT 
No. 8801 
Mr. Young says that two matters are involved in this 
appeal, one of which he claims is the transfer of the cause 
from Box Elder County to Cache C-ounty on a motion made 
for a change of venue and he having treated that matter 
first, we shall do likewise. 
We deny that the order transferring the trial from 
Box Elder County to Cache County is erroneous and void. 
We further declare that if counsel for plaintiff felt that it 
was unjust his remedy was appeal and had to be perfected 
within the statutory time after the granting of the order. 
Also, that when he appeared in court in Logan and proceed-
ed to trial without objection, that he thereby waived any 
objection to the jurisdiction of the court and having accepted 
its jurisdiction is bound by its decision. Also, if conflct-
ing affidavits are filed those in favor of the prevailing par-
ty will be taken as true c.nd the facts therein stated will be 
considered as established; and if a rational inference can 
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be drawn in favor of the course pursued by the lower court, 
its action will be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT ON CH.A.NGE OF VENUE 
In regard to the change of venue. The notice and mo-
tion for change of venue (Rec. 11 and 12) were served upon 
counsel for the defendants on the 31st of July, 1952, and 
with the motion were filed affidavits (Rec. 13 to 17) in SUP-
port of said motion. At said hearing Mr. Young filed coun-
ter affidavits (Rec. 18 to 21 )· At the end of the hearing 
(Rec. 77) the Court said: 
"The Court will take judicial knowledge of the condi-
tion of the country with reference to the use of the word 
"Communist". I believe that in most of our communi-
ties many Comn1unists have been pointed out and words 
passed around that certain individuals are Commun-
ists. I can refer you to a number in my home town 
that people clain1 are Communists that I have never met 
or seen, but I know where they live and who they are, 
and I believe that that would prejudice a person from 
having a fair trial if a person on the jury thought he 
was a Communist, particularly where the issue involv-
ed him and some of the members of his family that 
they may think are not Communists, and I believe the 
court should protect a man and do what he can to grant 
a fair trial. Under the affidavits that have been filed 
with reference to the subject of Communism, the (!ourt 
is of the opinion that the motion should be granted, 
even in view of the hardship that has been described the 
motion is granted and it's ordered that the case be 
transferred to Logan for trial in this District. Recess 
court." 
The Clerk made the following order for change of venue 
(Rec. 22): 
August Term, 1952. Tuesday, the twelfth day of 
August, 1952. 
Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson, Presiding. 
No. 6859 
George N. Anderson, and 
Imogene T. Anderson, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Marie T. Johnson and Chester 
N. Johnson, 
Defendants 
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ORDER CHANGE OF VENUE 
The motion for change of Venue before the court at 
this time. George N. Anderson of the plaintiffs pres-
ent in court with counsel Walter G. Mann, Esq., and 
Marie T. Johnson, one of the defendants present in 
court with counsel L. Roy B. Young. Opening state-
ment made to the court by counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant. Plaintiff counsel calls George N. Ander-
son, sworn and testifies is cross examined by defense 
counsel. Defense counsel calls Marie T. Johnson, 
sworn and testified is cross examined. The matter is 
argued and submitted to the court for decision. The 
motion for change of venue is granted and the case 
Ordered transferred to Cache County for trial. (Min-
ute Book 23, page 95). 
Thereafter counsel for plaintiff prepared a written order of 
change of venue to be signed by Judge Joseph G. Jeppson 
and delivered the original and copy to the court to be for-
warded to him at which time Judge Lewis Jones made cer-
tain written notations in the order and signed the order 
himself (Rec. 23). On the 21st day of August, 1952. the 
Clerk of the District Court of Box Elder County sent to 
LeRoy B. Young Esq., Attorney at Law, First Security 
Bank Building, Ogden, Utah, a copy of said order. Con-
sequently we have an oral order granted on the 12th of 
August by Judge Jeppson; a written order for the purpose 
of reducing said oral order to writing signed by Judge Lewis 
Jones on the 20th day of August and notice of it given to 
LeRoy B. Young on the 21st day of August. 
Attorney Young cites rule 63A which reads: 
DISABILITY. If by reason of death, sickness, or other 
disability, a judge before whom an action has been tried 
is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the 
court under these rules after verdict is returned or 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are filed, then 
any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the 
court in which the action was tried may perform those 
duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he can-
not perform those duties because he did not preside at 
the trial qr for any other reason, he may in his discre-
tion grant· a new trial.'' 
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The record is silent "\Vhy Judge Jones signed the order and 
a presumption arises in favor of its validity. The question 
might also arise, "Is it necessary to reduce the oral order 
to writing?" We find under Corpus Juris Vol. 67 page 206. 
Art. 346 the following: 
"FORM AND C·ONTENTS :-The order may be in writ-
in or oral, and it is not essential that it be signed. The 
order must comply 'vith the statute, but a substantial 
compliance is sufficient. Mere clerical mistakes do 
not invalidate the .order nor deprive the court to which 
the cause is sent of juris diction. The order must 
specify the County to which the cause is sent and show 
the caus·e for making it, but should not state the name 
of the Judge to try the case, nor need it fix a time for 
trial. The order should also show by whom it is re-
quested, that it is supported by affidavit, and that in 
the court's opinion the cause for change is good.'' 
The oral order of Judge Jeppson, mentioned above, met 
everyone of these requirements. VoL 5.6 of American Jr. 
Pr. Art. 76 page 77 in regard to an order for the change of 
venue in effect reads as follows: 
"ORDER FOR CHANGE AND EFFECT THEREOF:-
A change of venue is ordinarily made by a formal order 
of the court designating the county to which the change 
is to be made, but may, for some causes at least, such 
as that the action was instituted in the wrong county, 
be made by order of the judge at chambers. An order 
may be effective to work a change of venue even though 
it does not specifically provide therefor or designate 
formally the county to which it is changed. It is un-
doubtedly the better practice to designate the county, 
but the omission to employ such explicit words will not 
work a reversal where it is entirely clear"that the venue 
was in fact changed. The court to which change of 
venue is awarded is not '¥ithout jurisdiction because 
of a clerical error in the order reciting that the venue 
of the cause is changed, which uses the words "court" 
instead of "cause". An entry nunc pro tunc of an order 
of change of venue at a term subsequent to that in which 
the order was made is proper in a case where the omis-
sion of the entry of the proper term was due to negli-
gence in the Clerk. Although an accused has a right 
to be present at proceedings against him, it is not error 
for a court to grant a l.:hange of venue upon the request 
of the defendant in a f~lon? case, in his absence." 
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And this san1e article goes on and discusses the matter. It 
further showing that if the parties, after the order was 
made, proceed to trial that they then submit to the venue 
and the court takes jurisdiction. Record 84 shows that the 
parties appeared on the 1st day of December, 1952, in the 
court in Logan. 1\fr. Young made no objection to the juris-
diction of the court, but proceeded at once to assist in 
the drawing of a jury for jury duty, and the case was then 
tried. 
Mr. Young says the order is an appealable order and 
cites certain cases. We w~ll agree that the order is appeal-
able. One of the first cases in which this matter was In Re. 
Whitmore 35 Pac. 524. Then in the left hand column at the 
bottom of Page 525, it says: 
"It appears that the First District Court, at Provo, 
made an order in this case, December 27, 1892, which 
reads as follows: "In this case the court on its own 
motion, orders, that this case to be transferred to the 
Third District Court, at Salt Lake City, for further pro-
ceedings." - - - - Our statute authorizes the court to 
change the place of trial upon its own motion, if the 
parties do not agree, hut in that case the cause must be 
transferred to the nearest court. The presumption fol-
lows that the parties did not agree, and that there was 
good cause known by the judge for the transferring 
of the cause to the Third District Court." 
In the Whitmore case the parties met and proceeded with 
their hearing through a referee, no objection being made to 
the juris diction of the court, similar to ours. Then in the 
middle of the page 525, in the right hand column, the court 
said: 
"The order changing the place of trial from the First 
District Court was an appealable order, and, if errone-
ous, an appeal was the proper remedy to correct it." 
Another early case on the same subject matter was Elliot vs. 
Whitmore et al, 37 Pac. page 461, and was determined on 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the same state of facts. 
Our statute Sec. 78-13-11 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
reads: 
"Duty of Clerk-Fees and costs-Effect on j urisdic-
tion :-When an order is made transferring an action 
or proceeding for trial, the court must transmit thP 
pleadings and papers therein to the court to which it i~ 
transferred. The costs and fees therefor and filing the 
papers anew must be paid by the party at whose in-
stance the order was made ; provided, that when such 
order is made for the reason that the cause was com. 
menced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer and 
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff 
in the action within ten days after making of such 
order, or said cause shall be dis,missed for want of juris-
diction. The court to which an action or proceeding is 
transferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdic-
tion as if it had been originally commenced therein.'' 
'!'his s,ection was taken from the California Code Art. No. 
399, (25 Cal. Jur. Pr. Art. 45 page 913.) And the time for 
appeal is the statutory time to appeal any judgment, which 
in our case is one month, as determined in the matter of 
Chase vs. Superior Court et al, 99 Pac. 355. Under 25 Cal. 
Jur. Article 50 page 918, we have: 
"APPEAL AS STAY:-Under Section 949 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure an appeal from an order refusing to 
change the place of trial, or from an order changing the 
place of trial, does not operate to stay procedings in the 
lower court. But inasmuch as an appellate court has 
authority to make all orders or judgments necessary to 
render effectual its judgment on appeal fro1n an order 
denying the change, upon a reversal of such an order 
it may reverse a judgment rendered in the case by the 
lower court, although the appellant may have appeared at 
the trial and contested the right of the respondent to 
recover." 
In other words Mr. Young cites certain rules where judg-
ments must be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk 
and certain rules defining a judgment, but he failed to cite 
Rule 73A which is as follows: 
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"When an appeal is pern1itted from a District Court to 
the Supreme Court, the time in which an appeal may be 
taken shall be one month from the entry of the judg-
ment appealed from unless a shorter time is provided 
by law, - - - - " 
Then again on the question of appeal, in 25 Cal. Jur. Art. 51 
page 918: 
"REVIEW ON APPEAL :-All presumptions upon ap-
peal are in favor of an order changing the place of trial. 
It follows that where the motion was made upon two 
grounds, one of which is sufficient to sustain the action 
of the court in granting the motion, the order will not 
be disturbed. And, in accordance with the general 
rule that the action of a trial court will be upheld where 
there is substantial evidence to support it, it is held 
that an order based upon conflicting affidavits, either 
in granting or refusing a change of venue, will not be 
disturbed. When the affidavits are conflicting those 
in favor of the prevailing party will be taken as true, 
and the facts stated therein will be considered as es-
tablished; and if a rational inference can be drawn in 
favor of the course pursued by the lower court, its ac-
tion will be affirmed. 
If the plaintiff in the lower court presses the ac-
tion for trial, although the defendant claims that the 
case is one which, under the constitution, should have 
been commenced in another couty, he cannot success-
fully contend on appeal that the superior court of the 
county where the action was tried did not have juris-
diction.'' 
See the many cases cited thereunder. 
It appears to the writer that Mr. Young takes this at-
titude in his attempt to oppose the order asking for a change 
of venue: That rather than appeal from that order he 
would go to trial without further objection and run his 
chance on trying to be successful. If he failed then he 
would drop back and say that the court did not have a right 
to hear the case, even though he submitted himself to its 
jurisdiction. And even thougQ-~the statute under which he 
is proceeding says (Sec. 78-13-11 Utah Code Annotated 
1953): 
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ferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction as 
if it had been originally commenced therein." 
"The court to which an action or proceeding is trans-
Then the question comes up, "Can he do this?" There is a 
Kansas case in point being City of Garden City vs. Heller 
Sup. Court of Kansas, May 5, 1900. 60 Pac. 1060. This 
case was begun in Finney County of which Garden City 
forms a part and it was sent to Edwards County upon appli-
cation for change of venue. In the right hand column page 
1060 we have: 
"The record does not affirmatively show that an order 
granting the change was made, and it is contended that 
the absence of a formal order defeats the jurisdiction. 
It does not appear that the application was made; that 
the files and papers in the case were thereupon trans-
mitted to the District Court of Edwards County; that 
both parties appeared there, and the City submitted 
itself to the jurisdiction of that court; that the trial 
resulted in favor of the City, and the plaintiff prosecu-
ted error and obtained a reversal. The objection that 
the change of venue was irregularly made came after 
all these steps, and was too late. While the record is 
silent as to the ordering of a change, "all presumptions 
from silence on the part of the record should be con-
strued in favor of the regularity and validity of tpe pro-
ceeding of the court, and not against the regularity and 
validity of such pr.oceedings." Hunters Adm'R vs. 
Fergusons Adm'R 13 Kansas 462). However, it is not 
necessary to rest the decision of the point upon mere 
presumption. When the change was made the defen-
-dant did not make a timely objection, but, instead re-
cognized the validity of the proceedings in obtaining a 
change, and fully submitted itself to the jurisdiction of 
the court. 'I'he City asked and obtained a favorable 
. judgment without protest or objection, and must be held 
to have waived the irregularity, or any question as to 
the proper transfer of the case." See cases cited there-
in. 
In Otero Canal Company vs. Fosdick, a Colorado case found 
in 39 Pac. 332, where a questfon of change of venue came up, 
and on page 333 in the lower right hand column we find: 
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"It is, however, entirely unnecessary for us to consider 
the question as to whether or not the County Court 
erred in changing the venue to the District Court. It 
is sufficient, for the purpose of this case, to know that 
the parties entered a general appearance in the District 
Court, filed amended pleadings and proceeded to trial 
without objection, - - - - '' 
In the matter of the J. J.lVIayou Manufacturing Company vs. 
Consumers Oil and Refining Co., a Wyoming case found in 
146 Pac. 2d 738. The action was brought in one county 
and plaintiff filed a motion to take the case to another coun-
ty. The court ordered the change, but the clerk sent only 
certified copies of the proceedings. The case was tried and 
no objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court until 
on appeal. They had a statute similar to ours \vhich stated 
that after the papers were transferred and filed the court 
had the same jurisdiction as if originally filed in that court. 
(See the right hand column page 750) The court held any 
irregularities were waived by the appearance without ob-
jection and then going to the trial. Numeous other cases 
are cited therein. 
There is also the recent case of Daiki Otsuka vs. Balan-
gue et al, a California case 208 P. 2d 65, \vhich were appeals 
from the order denying the motion for a change of venue. 
This case is cited to show that the granting of a change of 
venue is an order which is appealable, and the time at which 
the appeal commences to run is the same as on any other ap-
peal. to-wit: one month. 
In regard to the affidavits and evidence offered. It is 
like Judge Jeppson said: The condition of the country is 
such that any mention of the word "Communism" is such 
that a person who had been charged with such a title has 
little chance of a fair trial. That the jury that tried the 
case had that before them was evident by the fact that one 
of the jury told the plaintiff, George N. Anderson (Rec. 72 
line 7) of him being considered a communist as follows. 
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"Mr. Beecher told me that he understood from what my 
sister was telling around town that I was a communist, 
therefore he had no sympathy with me on the trial.' 
The writer, in his affidavit (Rec. 16) reports a very 
flagrant assertion made to him in a public place about a rep-
resentation to the effect that two of the plaintiffs, George 
N. Anderson and wife, were ''Communists." It \vas com-
mon talk and extremely touchy, and the court so found and 
cons,equently granted the motion. 
In regard to the proposition that the evidence does not 
support the judgment or minute entry, we have already 
cited 25 Cal. Jur. Art. 51, but in closing wish to cite Vol. 56 
Am. Jr. Art. 73 and that part found on page 73: 
"----The majority rule, however seems to be that the 
grant or refusal of a change of venue upon a ground 
other than that of brniging the action in the wrong 
county reposes in the sound discretion of the judge pre-
siding over the court, and that a party to an action does 
not comply with the statutory formalities respecting 
applications for a change of venue thereby become en-
titled to a change as a matter of right, but, on the con-
trary, he must satisfy the court of the actual existence 
of the ground alleged, as justifying the change sought. 
His application is addressed to the discretion of the 
judge, whose ruling thereon will not be disturbed by an 
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears 
from the record - - - - - " 
Also Art. 74 and. quoting from page 75: 
"- - - - - However, the more stringent rule sometimes 
prevails that since a change of venue is left largely to 
the discretion of the trial court, its ruling thereon will 
not be disturbed unless it appears from the facts pre-
sented that the court acted unfairly and committed a 
palpable abuse of a sound discretion, or as it is some-
times stated, unless it is made clearly to appear that 
there has been such an abuse of discretion as to amount 
practically to a denial of justice. - - - -". 
CONCL,USION ON CHANGE OF VENUE 
Consequently we contend and submit that a valid judgment 
or order was made in the first instance ; that the evidence 
does support it; that the defendants having submitted them-
10 
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selves to the jurisdiction of the Cache County Court and 
having failed to appeal within the statutory time allowed 
by law from the order for change of venue, cannot now 
raise any question to the jurisdiction of the Cache County 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS O·N THE MERITS 
Counsel for plaintiffs cannot agree with Mr. Young's 
statement of facts and list hereafter their statement with 
the appropriate references to the record. !But before begin-
ning and due to the fact that Mr. Young has intimated and 
implied in his brief, page 19, that Judge Jones might have 
found for his client when he says : 
"The court (with tongue in cheek) over-ruled these mo-
tions but stated that had he been trying the case with-
out a jury he would have found the issues in favor of 
the defendants." (Tr. 434) 
He didn't go on to say that while Judge Jones had his tongue 
in his cheek that he also said, (R. 434): 
"But I can't bring myself to say that there is not a sub-
stantial conflict in the evidence. ----I still think there 
was sufficient evidence there to go to the jury. -- -- I 
also want to comment in the record in this case in view 
of the charge made that the jury in this case was 
biased and prejudiced in favor of the plaintiffs, that the 
court can see no evidence of this jury over here in 
Cache County being moved by passion and prejudice to 
reach the verdict that it did. On the contrary, the 
court feels that the jury acted without passion and pre-
judice in arriving at the verdict." 
"I also want to say in the record, the issues raised 
by the parties and the arguments of the parties to the 
jury and the evidence didn't touch on the main issue 
which the jury passed on, as I see it, and that is whether 
there should be an equal distribution, in the background, 
of this estate as an inchoate matter of equitable jus-
tice between the children, and not from favoritism to 
one child who was able to get possession of the body of 
the grantor before he died and obtain certain favors. 
And although a hundred new trials were granted it's 
my opinion that no jury in Cache County or Box Elder 
County or any other county under those circumstances 
would reach a different result. It is to be noted, of 
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course, that in the Box Elder County trial, the court 
was lulled into an erroneous construction of the dead 
man's statute, and the two brothers were not permitted 
to testify to certain matters. So the order may be as 
indicated.'' 
Lorenzo W. Anderson \vas the father of the plaintiff's, 
George N. Anderson and Lorenzo W. Anderson Jr., and the 
defendant Marie 'T. Johnson. He was a widower in the year 
1943 and had been for many years last past and was 68 years 
of age (R. 242). He was the owner of the following prop-
erty: A home in which he lived in Brigham City; a home 
in Brigham C'ity called the Christensen place; a farm and 
pasture in Garland; a dry farm in Promontory, Utah, con-
sisting of 432. acres and a building lot in Brigham City, Utah, 
at the back of the home in which he resided. 
In March of 1943 he made out three deeds to his three 
children. The son George was given the Christensen place 
in Brigham City and an undivided one third (1/3) interest 
in Promontory. The son Lorenzo was given the Garland 
farm, the building lot back of the father's home and an un-
divided one third (1/3) interest in Promontory. The daugh-
ter Marie was given the father's home place and an undivi-
ded one third (1/3) interest in Promontory. The father re-
tained the pasture in Garland. This covered all of the prop-
erty that he then owned. 
The son George first heard of these deeds shortly after 
they were made up. He was living in Brigham City at the 
time and had the father to supper. (Rec. 219). While there 
the father told George and his wife about the deeds and in-
vited them back to the house. The three of them went to 
the house and in the front room on the table were three 
deeds. The father told them what each deed contained and 
then (Rec. 220 line 21) : 
"He took this deed and held it out and said, "I want you 
both to take it." So we reached out and both of us took 
the deed. He says, uNow, each of you handle it and 
look at it," which \Ve did. And then he explained, he 
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said, "I'm giving you this deed 'vith the understanding 
that I \vould like to have the revenues from my proper· 
ty as long as I live." He said, "Now you can record this 
deed if you want to, but I wish you wouldn't until after 
I die. At which time, he said, ''I would like you three 
children to come and get your deeds together. Each of 
you will then know that the other was getting so that 
there would be no feelings.'' (Underlining added). 
The father explained to them (Rec. 221) that the deeds 
would be kept in a cubby hole of the family desk. It was 
\\t·ritten in the father's handwriting and it had been witnes-
sed and notarized. This family desk was described by 
Lorenzo as follows (Rec. 192. line 12): 
"A. I said it was a roller top desk with dra\vers on the 
sides, on each side. There were three drawers on the 
left side. My drawer was the top one, Marie's the cen-
ter, George's is the bottom one. On thP right &ide was 
a double drawer about that big. 
Q. When you say "that big" it doesnt go into that re-
cord. 
A. Approximately a foot deep. And then a smaller 
drawer underneath. Dad kept his protractor and draft-
ing equipment, drawing paper and such items as that 
in the double drawer. Then up in the back of the desk 
were four little drawers. George's drawer was the one 
on the left, Marie's in the center, and mine was third 
from the left. The fourth one Dad I think used for 
keeping papers or letters or something in. Then over 
beyond these small drawers on the back of the desk was 
this cubby hole. There was a key that was always left 
in the cubby hole because when you'd close the door it 
wouldn't stay closed unless you locked it. So the key 
was left in there so we all had access to it. T'he key 
was there. We could unlock it any time we wanted to." 
The son Lorenzo first heard about the deeds in the 
spring of 1943 while he was working for the F.B.I. in the 
Western part of South Dakota, at which time the father 
wrote a Jetter to him (Rec. 86) and told him that he had 
deeded the property to his three children. In October of 
1944 the father visited with his son Lorenzo in St. Paul at 
which time they discussed the deeds (Rec. 87). At that 
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meeting the son advised the father that he was making a 
mistake in deeding the property to his children without re-
serving a life estate but the father said he did not want a 
life estate and gave his reasons, and said: 
"I trust you three children. I know you're not going to 
record the deeds until I die and that you are going to let 
me have the property to manage and keep the proceeds 
from it." 
The son Lorenzo then suggested a will, but the father said 
he had already disposed of his property by deeds and that he 
did not believe in wills; he asked that the deeds be not re-
corded until he died. He said that Lorenzo's deed was in 
the cubby hole in the desk and that he had given it to Marie 
to give to Lorenzo. 
In the fall of 1944 the son Lorenzo passed through Salt 
Lake City and visited his sister Marie, who was at that time 
quite worried about her husband beng drafted into the army 
(Rec. 88) and asked Lorenzo if he had any objection if they 
went to Brigham City and ran the farms in the hope that her 
husband might be deferred and Lorenzo's permission was 
given. 
It was either while Loenzo was home on this visit, or 
the next, that the father introduced him to the tenant of the 
Garland farm (Rec. 89) and advised him that Lorenzo was 
the owner of it and that when Mr. Anderson died he would 
have to do business with Lorenzo. He also, at or about that 
time, told others that he was going to deed his property to 
his children and that he had so deeded it. (Rec. 268 and 
439). 
In the spring of 1945, the son Lorenzo made a visit to 
Brigham City and a conversation took place between him and 
Marie who was then living with her father (Rec. 91). At 
that time Marie took Lorenzo into the bedroom where the 
deeds were and they examined them and Marie asked Lo· 
renzo if he wanted to take his deed with him. (Rec. 92) but 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lorenzo decided to leave it there in the desk. 
In the spring of 1946 the son Lorenzo again returned to 
Brigham City and at that time his sister Marie told him that 
she was afraid that her brother George was going to try to 
get more than his share of the property (Rec. 94) and they 
decided to check the deeds again. In the reorcd page 95 line 
20, we find: 
"A. First of all I checked over the deeds. I checked 
mine carefully and then Marie said, "Will you check 
mine?" So I looked at hers. Then I said., "Marie, if 
there's any question as to the validity of these deeds 
we're going to have to prove delivery. Now," I said, 
"Dad told me he had given my deed to you to be given 
to me," and I said, "Now is that true?' and she said, 
"Yes, it is," I said, "Well, I'd like to know right now 
whether it's true or not. If it isn't then I'm going to 
talk to Dad about it so he can give my deed to me direct-
ly." She said, "Dad gave me your deed to be given to 
you. 
She then got the deed again and handed it to him. 
In September of 1946, after the father had had a hea1·t 
attack, the family were all home. At that time the brother 
George was being transferred to Ogden, Utah, in his work. 
He had no place to live and the father suggested that he 
move into the Christensen place. It was discussed that a 
tenant was in the place at the time, but the father said, 
(Rec. 97) "You are the owner of the property and as owner 
you can evict this tenant under the o~.P.A. regulations." He 
then told George to get his deed and for Lorenzo to go with 
him and meet the tenant, show him the deed and ask him 
to move. (See also testimony of Lorenzo, Rec. 225). 
The tenant moved out and George and his family moved 
into the Christensen place. However the house needed a 
lot of repair and George wondered about recording his deed. 
His father met him at his house and they talked it over (Rec 
226). His father told him: 
"You can take that deed down and record it, but, Marie 
and Lorenzo might feel hu:.--t if you recorded your third 
interest in Promontory at this time." 
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It was then decided between them to let the father take the 
old deed and make two new ones, one for the Christensen 
place and one for Promontory. They later met according to 
appointment and the father signed both deeds and Marie 
signed them at witness, and witnessed the delivery. (Rec. 
228 line 10.) : 
"My wife and I were there. My father handed the two 
deeds to us at once. This time he never made much 
fuss about them. He merely passed them over. I took 
them and then my wife took them from me, as I remem-
ber. Passing the two deeds at the same time." 
The Christensen deed was recorded and the new deed on 
Promontory remained in the desk with the other two deeds 
and were seen from time to time by different members of 
the family. (Rec. 231-232-233). 
In the meantime the father had more sickness and the 
wives of the brothers Lorenzo and George assisted in the 
nursing of Mr. Anderson (Rec. 99). The defendant Marie 
on the 16th day of July, 1947, (Rec. 101 Exhibit L-7), sent 
a letter to her brother Lorenzo wherein she speaks about the 
father being not too alert and that their brother George is 
trying to get some advantage. "\Vhereupon Lorenzo tele-
phoned his sister Marie (Rec. 103) from California and on 
line 28 we have: 
"A. I asked Marie how Dad was and she said that his 
condition was getting worse all the time. 
Q. What condition? 
A. Well, physical and. mental. 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. And she mentioned that George was trying to get 
some money to finish medical school and that he had 
asked Dad for some money and Dad had mentioned that 
he didnt have any cash on hand, that he'd either have to 
mortgage or sell property, and Marie said, "What shall 
I d.o ?" she said, "Dad isn't alert enough to be able to 
handle the property," So I said, "Marie, take the deeds 
down to the Recorder's Office the first thing in the 
morning and record them." 
Q. What deeds did you sRy to take down? 
A. My deed and her deed. 
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Q. What did she say to that? 
A. She said, "I'll go down the first thing in the morn-
ing and record them at the Recorder's Office. 
Instead of recording the deeds as promised, Marie set about 
to have her father prepare a will wherein she and her hus-
band could buy the Promontory property for $10,000.00, 
even though it was worth $30,000.00 and all within a week 
from the time she had reported to her brother that "Dad 
isn't alert enough to handle the property." 
She prepared in her own handwriting (Exhibit L-1) a 
rough draft of the will and took it to her cousin William E. 
Davis, an attorney, for preparation on the 23rd day of July, 
1947. On her direct testimony she denied having made any 
suggestions about the making of the will (Rec. 362) or be-
ing present when Attorney Davis talked with her father 
(Rec. 362), and on cross examination she claimed she knew 
nothing of what the will was to contain until after it was 
made (Rec. 390). When shown Exhibit L-1 she admitted 
it was in her handwriting, but said the datehad been chang-
ed (Rec. 392-3). She even said that she had copied this ex-
hibit after the will had been made and sent it to her brother 
Lorenzo (Rec. 395 lines 19 to 22), also (Rec. 196). Yet an 
examination of the Exhibit L-1 shows that it is an instruc-
tion written by one person to another about the property of 
a third person. She admitted that the attorney gave her the 
will to read when he brought it to the house (Rec. 399-400) 
and then for the first time said: 
"Maybe she had been to s·ee him about preparing it." 
And then finally, under cross-examination (Rec. 405) admit-
ted she had prepared Exhibit L-1 and delivered it to the at-
torney for the preparation of the will. She, at the safe time, 
to-~'it July 24th, 1947, wrote her brothe1· Lorenzo a letter 
(Exhibit L-2) advising him of the will, but says that she is 
not going to let her brother Geo.rge-know about it. (Rec. 
403). George was to receive nothing under the terms of the 
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·will. She therein describes her father's condition as gradu-
ally getting worse. 
She did not record her deed, or her brother's deed!' as 
promised (Rec. 407) nor did she notify her brother that she 
had not recorded it. (Rec. 407). 
The father had another sick spell in ..c:-\ugust of 1948 and 
at that time the son Lorenzo returned home. (Rec. 104). 
The brother George had been home in the spring of the year 
and at that time the father. hardly knew him, his health was 
so poor (Rec. 235) . When Lorenzo was there the father 
was bed ridden and fell asleep while Loren·zo and Marie talk-
ed.. Marie at that time took the will from a black book, 
(R·ec. 104), at which time her brother called it to her atten-
tion that she had moved the deeds from the cubby hole and 
she said (Rec. 105 line 2): 
"Well, I'm keeping the deeds and the will together." 
She said, "George doesn't know anything about the will 
and I don't want him to know about it.'' So she says, 
"I'm keeping them all here in this book." 
At that time Marie was told by Lorenzo that he did not be-
~ieve the will was any good because the father had already 
disposed of his property and that the will could be contested. 
He then said (Rec. 106 line 2) : 
"Do you still have the deeds?" "Oh, yes," she says, 
"They're here in the book." And she got the deeds out. 
That would be my deed, her deed and George's deed. I 
said "Marie, these deeds are good. Don't let anything 
happen to them." She said, "Don't worry ,I won't. 
Neither of the boys returned home again after the fall 
of 1948, until after the father's death. At that time each 
boy returned, the first words that they heard from Marie 
were, that her Dad had given to her and her husband Promon 
tory (R.ec. 238 lines 1 to 8, Rec. 107 lines 1 to 7 and Rec. 255 
lines 23 to 28) . A deed had been signed, Exhibit L-25, on 
the 7th day of February, 1949, to Promontory to Marie and 
her husband and also in.cl uded in the deed was the home and 
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the lot that was to go to Lorenzo. A deed (Exhibit L-26) 
to the son Lorenzo to the Garland property was also mad.e 
out on the same day. 
These deeds were executed under rather peculiar cir-
cumstances. According to Marie her father was dressed 
(Rec. 372) in pants, shirt and slippers. According to J. W. 
Phillips, her witness, who acknowledged his signature 
(Rec. 316), shoes, shirt and trousers. According to the 
brother in law Ellis Demars, who called upon him almost 
daily after the first of January, 1949, until his death (Rec. 
275) that he was dressed in his robe from day to day and 
that he did not remember of ever seeing him dressed after 
the first of the year. Also, according to Mari's witness, Dr. 
S. L. Moskowitz, from the time of his first attack in August, 
1946, he was practically incapacitated until his death (Rec. 
329). Also her doctor described what he meant by confu-
sion as that a patient doesn't realize what is going on, would 
not know where he was o:t; recognize his own home (Rec. 
337 -8). Marie admitted that he was irrational at times; 
that he didn't recognize his home or them and sometimes 
had a blank look on his face (Rec. 404) . His sister Edna 
Demars said that at one time he lost his sight and mind and 
was paraly""'Zed (Rec. 443). That he didn't recognize his 
home (Rec. 444). That she had come to his house where 
he's had his most costly books and different people were 
there and he said (Rec. 445) : 
"You can have them. You can take them home." 
And we knew very well he wouldn't part with them for 
gold." 
His brother in law Ellis Demars took him for several rides 
in the spring of the year, just before he died. He took him 
to Garland, Utah, to visit his sister in April or May of 1949 
(Rec. 275). That Mr. Anderson appeared rational to begin 
with; that Mr. Anderson pointed ou the Garland farm and 
said that it was now his son Lorenzo's place (Rec. 276); 
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that Mr. D·emars asked hin1 if this property was the same 
as when he first made his deeds out and he said: "Just the 
same." (Rec. 277). This was after the 1949 deeds were 
purportedly mad.e. That after they had been there for 
awhile he got a vacant stare (Rec. 277 -8) ; that Mr. Demars 
had seen this same stare before the first of January, 1949. 
That when they started home and passed the Sugar Factory, 
he couldn't recognize it and said that they were going in the 
wrong direction. They stopped in the town of Elwood and 
where he and. Mr. Anderson had surveyed at one time for a 
city water line and Mr. Anderson claimed he had never seen 
the place before and when the brother in law was asked to 
describe how he looked, he said (Rec. 2'78 line 30 and 279 
line 1) 
"Well, he still had that hazy appearance on his face. 
He didn't know vvhere he was at." At another time he took 
him through Mantua and Dry Lake, where they had sur-
veyed at one time together, and he saw that he was becoming 
confused and when he said that he didn't recognize the place, 
he took him home but when he got there Mr. Anderson said 
it was not his place and to take him home (Rec. 280). That 
he took him for a ride to Perry, a town three miles south 
of Brigham City and stopped for a drink of soda water and 
he did not recognize the town of Perry or the Perry Meeting 
I-Iouse, or the surveying work that they had done around it, 
and Mr. Demars took him home. Mr. Demars also describes 
his clothing as a robe and slippers and that he had never 
seen him dressed otherwise since the first of the year. 
(Rec. 281 and 282). That he took him again to Garland and 
stopped in Bear River City, the place where Mr. Anderson 
was born, but he did not recognize it. When he got back 
home, he did not recognize his home (Rec. 283 and 284) · 
He also tells about him trying to give away his valuable 
books and in the record at page 286, line 9, we have: 
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"Well, on one occasion ,Bishop Petersen at that time, 
Fred L. Petersen, he came in and he says, "I want you 
to take this book." And Marie, she winked at me and 
I just nodded back to her and when the Bishop went out 
of the room we just took the book from him and turned 
around and put them back on his desk. His old desk 
was in the front bedroom at that time." 
These deeds, referred to as the 1949 deeds, were executed 
during that period of time when he wanted to give some-
thing away. 
Marie did not advise her brother Lorenzo of any new 
deed executed by the father, even though she wrote him a 
letter a day after (Exhibit L-28) .. She did not record her 
deed until the day before the father died. Her deed is Ex-
hibit L-25. She did not send or give the deed made by her 
father in 1949 in favor of Lorenzo, but instead after the fun-
eral gave it to Attorney George M. Mason who demanded 
that before he give it up, that both the boys and their wives 
sign a Quit Claim Deed to Marie on all of the property that 
she got hy the 1949 deeds (Rec. 121 also 240, 241) which 
they refused to do. 
Mr. Young on page 16 of his brief and in the last of the 
second paragraph, said: 
"His disposal of this home was displeasing to the de-
ceased.'' 
The only evidence in the record regarding this is found in 
the record at page 419, line 27, when Marie answered, 
"He was quite upset when he heard he had sold the 
home." 
Counsel then objected to it as not responsive to which 
the court ordered: 
"It's stricken and the jury is instructed to disregard it." 
In this regard. Marie did say in the record at poge 419, that 
someone else had come in and told her father that George 
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had sold the house and that she had not told him. However 
when counsel produced a letter written by her (Rec. 421 and 
422) (Exhibit L-36), she admitted that she had told the 
father of the sale of the Christensen place by George at a 
time when she thought thatGeorge was trying to get some 
~vantage of her. 
The 1943 deeds were burned by Marie (Rec. 256 line 28). 
She claimed in her direct testimony (Rec. 376-7) that the 
father gave them to her and told her to burn them. 
The case was submitted to a jury to decide the question 
of delivery of the 1943 deeds, and they were also instructed 
to determine if the 1949 deeds were delivered and if so, if 
the maker had the mental capacity to make delivery of the 
same. (See instructions No. 1 to 15, R.ec. 25 to 32). The 
jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the plaintiffs 
on the interrogatories submitted with its instructions (Rec. 
33) and the court entered Findings of Fact and COnclusions 
of Law and Decree establishing the 1943 deeds. 
ARGUMENT ON THE·.'MERITS 
The issues in this case raise three primary questions 
treated by counsel for the defendants : 
1. The question of fact as to whether there was a de-
livery of the 1943 deeds. 
2. The question of fact as to whether Mr. Anderson 
was competent at the time of the 1949 deeds, and 
3. A question of fact as to the delivery of the 1949 
deeds. 
This case brings before the Court for the first time, so far 
as we know, Rule 39, Subsection C, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as follows: 
"Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent: In all actions 
not triable of right by a jury the Court upon motion or 
of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory 
jury, or, with the consent of both parties may order a 
trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if 
trial by jury had been a matter of right." 
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The action below was tried by a jury on all issues, and 
no parties objected to a trial by the jury; so we deem these 
facts to justify the statement that it was tried with the con-
sent of both parties and that therefore the verdict, regard-
less of the form of the action, legal or equitable, has the 
same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right~ 
Therefore, if there is any substantial evidence to go to the 
jury upon either of the three interrogatories, this Court 
'viii affirm the lower court's decision. 
Assuming for the purpose of this brief that the new 
rules of court neither create nor abolish any jury rights, this 
portion of the case will be presented on the basis that there 
are mixed questions of law and fact and that legal as well as 
equipable relief has been asked. Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, Barron and Holtzoff, Volume 2, page 607, Note 45; 
the text treats the rules as rules of common sense where 
there are both law and equitable questions raised. We sub-
mit that the question of delivery of the 1943 deeds is a legal 
question of fact, as is also the question for the recovery of 
possesion of real property. 
State v. Hart, 26 Utah 229, 72 P. 938. That case held 
that the fact that injunctive relief is sought does not de-
prive either party of his right to have legal issues submit-
ted to a jury. 
The cases in Utah on the question of whether or not a 
trial is on equitable or legal bases have a long history, prac-
tically all of them being cited in the case of Petty vs. Clark. 
129 P. 2d 568. Some of the earlier cases held that where 
both questions of law or equity were involved, the equitable 
issue should he tried first, and the the Court should proceed 
with the trial on legal matters. (Park vs. Wilkinson, Utah 
60 Pacific 945). The later cases, however, such as the Pet-
ty case, try all matters simultaneously; and the legal issues 
are submitted to the jury, and the Court determines the 
equitable relief to be applied. Some of the earlier Utah 
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cases cited in the Petty case, held contrary to the later cases; 
but it is apparent that the Petty case overruled these. See 
the last paragraph in the concurring opinion of Justice 
'Volfe. 
The actio:n at bar is an action for the recovery for spe-
cific real property, or to establish a right to real property; 
and the rule related to the delivery of the deed seems to be 
best stated in 26 C. J. S. Page 256 as follows: 
"Whether a deed has been delivered and accepted ordin-
arily involves a mixed question of law and fact to be de-
termined by the jury where the evidence is conflicting; 
but the question of what facts, if proved., amount to a 
delivery is a question of law." 
Therefore, in this case after the Court instructed the jury as 
to what acts would be necessary to constitute a delivery, it 
left it to the jury to ascertain whether Mr. Anderson had ac-
complished acts sufficient to amount to a delivery; and the 
jury held in favor of the plaintiff. T'he rule in Utah is cited 
with approval in the note in 117 A.L.R. Page 3lc: 
"Where a statutory suit to quiet title, remove cloud, or 
determine advers,e claims to real estate is maintainable, 
the parties are as a general rule entitled to a jury trial 
if the defendant is in possession even though the statute 
does not affirmatively provide for trial by jury." 
Park vs. Wilkinson, Utah, 21 Utah 279, 60 Pac. 945, is cited 
and discussed under this annotation. At page 38 of the 
same annotation, it is stated that generally in most cases 
where the parties claim legal title and not merely an equit-
able title, such as a mortgage, the action is one in law; but 
the rule seems to be different in Federal Courts because the 
remedy at law is adequate and being entitled to a jury trial 
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. Under 
this heading at page 39, the Utah case of Norback vs. Board 
of Directors etc., 37 Pac. 2d 339 is cited with approval. In 
that case the action was brought to establish an easement 
under claim of ownership and for damages. There the Court 
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said: 
"The primary purpose of the instant case is the estab-
lishment of an easement based upon an alleged prescrip-
tive user. If plaintiff fails in this, his cause of action 
fails. The right of injunctiYe relief cannot come into ex-
istence until the easement has been established." 
This issue the plaintiff was entitled to have tried before 
a jury. In analyzing that holding, it is apparent that the 
plaintiff was entitled to have the jury determine whether or 
not he had an easement; and then if he did, the Court would 
apply the extraordinary equitable injunctive relief. This 
fits exactly into the pattern that we have on this appeal, 
namely that we are entitled to have a jury answer the ques-
tions as to whether or not there was a delivery of the 1943 
deeds. Then if there was, such a delivery, the Court may 
apply relief either by partition of the property among the 
sons and daughter, or by quieting the title in the respective 
parties. 
See also Buckley vs. Cox et al recently decided Utah 
No. 7730. 
The questions involved are now set out in the following 
three sections of our Judicial Code in Utah Code Annotated, 
1953: 
78-21-1. "Right to jury trial - In actions for the r·e-
covery of specific real or personal property, with or 
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon 
contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for in-
juries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a 
jury trial is waived or a referee is odrered. 
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact- All ques-
tions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those 
mentioned in the next section, are to be decided by the 
jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, 
except when otherwis·e provided. 
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of la-"~1 - All ques-
tions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the 
facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of 
statutes and other writings, and the application of rules 
of evidence are to be decided by the court and all dis-
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cussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the know-
ledge of the court is by law made evidence of a fact, the 
court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, vvho are 
bound to accept it." 
There is not a great deal of difference between the old Code 
and the above excerpts from the Judicial Code. The Code 
of 1943 carried the old system of disposing of cases by in-
cluding the following: 
"In cases where there are issues of both law and fact, 
the issue of law must first be disposed of.' 
I do not find this provision in the present Code. 
An interesting case is found in the California Court, 
Longley vs. Brooks, 92 P. 2d 394. This was a case where 
there was a claimed delivery of deeds by the defendant not-
withstanding the fact that the grantor retained custody 
after delivery. The Court in disposing of the matter on ap-
peal stated. 
"In accordance with well-established law, it is clear that 
if the findings relating to the delivery of the deed to the 
respondent are substantially supported by the evidence, 
or if there is a substantial conflict in the evidence upon 
which the findings are made to rest, the resulting judg-
ment may not be disturbed. 
In any event, the weight to be given the testimony as to 
the sealing of the envelope, as well as that of all the 
other testimony bearing on the question of the delivery 
of the deed, presented a question of fact for determina-
tion by the trial court." 
The principal difference in the Longley case and the case be-
fore this Court is that the Longley case was tried by the 
Court, but the Court no doubt treated the matter of the de-
livery as a matter of law and not of equity. On the other 
hand, Mr. Young assumes without argument in his brief 
that this is a case in equity and not at law. 
Under his argument on Point 10, he states: 
"As we have heretofore suggested, this being a suit in 
equity, this Court has the duty to review the evidence 
and to determine whether or not the findings are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence.'' 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this assumption counsel is in error. 
This Court held in the case of Babcock vs. Dangerfield, 
94 P. 2d. 862, which was an action to try title to real prop-
erty and quiet the title thereto, that the court committed 
reversible error because it held the case to be one of equity 
and the appellant was entitled to a jury and reversed the 
case for that reason. As a matter of fact, as held in the 
Babcock case, it is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove 
a prima facie case; and when that is proved, the case is one 
for the jury and it is reversible error to refuse a jury. 
The court below adequately instucted the jury as to the 
question of intention of a grantor upon the delivery of a 
deed, stating in substance, (Instuction No. 5) with reference 
to the 1943 deeds, that the question of delivery is essential 
ly the matter of the intent of the grantor; and that the ques-
tion to be determined by the jury was: Did Lorenzo W. An-
derson intend to personally pass the title to the property by 
the 1943 deeds to the grantees, and did he intend to divest 
himself of any right to recall these deeds? 
In the Minnesota case of Exsted vs. Exsted 117 A.L.R. 
599, (279 N.W. 554) the Minnesota Court laid down the rule: 
"If the deed was left with the register of deeds with the 
intention of immediately investing title in Harry, and 
with the intent of relinquishing control over it, then 
there was a delivery of the deeds." 
North Dakota has laid .down a similar rule found in Stark 
vs. Wannemacher. This was a case involving .a conflict of 
evidence as to the delivery and failure of consideration of a 
promissory note. While the North Dakota Court does not 
treat at length in the question of intention, it did hold that 
the verdict of the jury as to the delivery was binding on the 
Supreme Court where there was conflict in the evidence. 
Now having treated first the matter that the jury was 
the trier of the facts and that the Court so recognized them 
as the trier of the facts and amply instructed them as to 
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what their duties were in determining the questions of fact, 
and the jury having so determined that the 1943 deeds were 
valid and were actually delivered, let us review the cases and 
the evidence in this connection. 
The son Lorenzo testified that his father sent him a let-
ter to South Dakota telling him that he had prepared deeds 
conveying· the property away (Rec. 86). That Mr. Ander-
son came to St. Paul in O'ctober, 1944 and again told the son 
Lorenzo about the deeds. That there was a considerable 
discussion between the father and the son at said time; the 
son advising him not to convey his property away unless he 
made a deed reserving a life estate, or to make a will. :But 
the father gave him his reasons for not wanting a life estate 
and that he wanted no will because he had already disposed 
of his property (Rec. 87 and 88); that his son's deed was 
home in his desk; that he had given it to his daughter Marie 
to deliver to him when he returned. Later, after the father 
had made these statements, he introduces his son Lorenzo 
to a· tenant by the name of Garfield and tells him that his 
son Loren·zo is the owner of the farm, and that after Mr. An-
derson dies that he will have to deal with the son Lorenzo 
(Rec. 90). That when the son Lorenzo returned home in 
1945, marie, who was entrusted with his deed did get the 
deeds and show them to him and asked him if he wanted to 
take his deed home and he .advises her that he would leave 
it in the desk for safe keeping (Rec. 91 and 92). That he 
returned again in 1946 and at this time the sister Marie was 
suspicious of her brother George and asked her brother 
Lorenzo to check her deed. That at that time he had a 
convers.ation with her telling her that delivery was n1ighty 
important and that his father had advised him that he had 
delivered his deed to Marie for him, and that he asked her 
at that time if that was a fact and that if it was not so, he 
would have to talk the matter over with his father. That 
she told him that the fnther had delivered the deed to her 
for Lorenzo and gave it to him at that time (Rec. 94 and 95). 
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That when the son Lorenzo 'vas home in the fall of 1946 and 
the father was sick, that the father told Lorenzo to go with 
his brother George and tell the tenant of the Christensen 
place to get out because the home belonged to George and to 
take the deed along to show him. (Rec. 98) . That the son 
Lorenzo in July 16, 1947, received a letter (Exhibit L-7) 
from Marie saying that the father was not too alert and that 
George, her brother, was trying to take advantage and what 
should they do. At that time Lorenzo phoned from Cali-
fornia and told Marie to record both of their deeds at the 
Court House and she promised to do it for him (Rec. 101-
103). That he returned again in August 1948 and at that 
time she showed him the will that she claimed the father had 
made out and that the deeds at that time had been taken out 
of their usual place and put in a black book where the will 
was, under Marie's control. That Lorenzo told Marie at 
that time that the deeds are good and to let nothing happen 
to them and she so promised (Rec. 104-106). That when 
Lorenzo returned for the funeral the first words frof Marie 
were to the effect that the father had given her Promontory 
(Rec. 107). 
The Court is invited to check the cross-examination 
made by Mr. Young of the son Lorenzo. He was kept on the 
stand for hours under a gruelling test and his testimony 
under all of said cross-examination strengthened and im-
proved his direct testimony as to these facts. The brother 
George tetifies that he heard of the deeds about the same 
time they were made, when the father was to his place for 
supper (Rec. 219). That they returned to the house and 
there were three deeds laying on the table. The father ex-
plained what they contained and then handed his deed to him 
and his wife and tells them that at that time that he is giving 
it to them and that all he wants is the revenue and that they 
could record it if they wished, but he would rather they 
would not, but keep it in the family desk. (Rec. 220). He 
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had already explained to his son George on previous occa-
sions the necessity of parting with the deed to complete the 
delivery (Rec. 221 and 222). At the time the son George 
was about to go into the Armed Services in 1944, he talked 
with his father about what would happen to his interest if 
he died (Rec. 223) and his father said his wife would get it. 
And in 1946, when George decided to return to Brigham City 
his father tells him to get his deed and. show it to the tenant 
who was living in the Christensen place and tell the tenant 
to move that it was his property (Rec. 225). That because 
of the fact that numerous expenses would be involved in re-
modeling the house he talked to his father about recording 
the deed and together they determined that two new deeds 
should be made up, one on Promontory and one on the house. 
He could record the one on the house at that time and the 
other deed would be kept back with the deed of the other 
brother Loren'zo and his sister Marie, and be recorded after 
the death of Mr. Anderson (Rec. 226). That two new deeds 
were made out and both delivered to him and the sister 
Marie witnessed them (R~ec. 227). That the deed was ac-
tually handed to him and taken into his possession (Rec. 
228) and the deed to the Christensen place is still in exist-
ence and was offered in as Exhibit L-24 and shows Marie 
appearing as a witness. That he saw this deed in the desk 
several times later (Rec. 231, 232 and 233). That he re-
received a G .I. Farm in Idaho and had to sell the house in 
which he was living in and move to Idaho and did not again 
return after the fall of 1948 until the father's death. That 
when he returned from the funeral and met Marie, the first 
thing she said is that she has obtained Promontory (Rec. 
238). 
Again on cross-examination, Mr. Young, with all the 
power at his command attempted to tear that story apart. 
George again explained how he received the deed (Rec. 244) 
for the year 1943 and how the fa thr wished that he wouldn't 
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record it (Rec. 246). Why the two deeds were given when 
he took over the Christensen place to live in (Rec. 248). On 
re-direct examination he \vas asked on page 256 of the re-
cord, if he knew what had become of the deeds and he said 
that Marie told him that she had burned them. Mr. Ander-
son's sister Edna Demars tells of a conversation with her 
brother, where he told her "This is the way I have divided 
my property" (Rec. 439). That his brother in law, Ellis 
Demars tells of a conversation where his brother in law, Mr. 
Anderson, told him that he was going to deed his property 
to his children (Rec. 268) and then later told him that he 
had so deeded the property to his children (Rec 268). Mr. 
Demars also told of a conversation with him (Rec. 277) that 
took place either in April or May of 1949, some two or three 
months after the purported 1949 deeds were made out, 
where Mr. Anderson said that his property was still the 
same as when he had first made his deeds out. 
Then, the positive testimony of the actual delivery of 
the deed to George. And the actual fact of delivery to the 
son Lorenzo by the father to Marie and Marie to Lorenzo we 
have a conflict arise by lVIarie saying that she did not know 
of her father signing the deeds in March of 1943 (Rec. 346) 
and then saying (Rec. 347) he told her about the deed on 
just one occasion. That he showed it to her but never gave 
it to her and denies that he ever gave her Lorenzo's deed 
(Rec. 347). But on page 348 she says: "I was told not to 
record them until after he died." She admits that her 
brother Lorenzo came in June 1945 and looked at the deeds, 
but can remember of no conversation. He came again in 
1946, but she can't remember any conversation (R:ec. 352), 
but says that there was a daughter's deed there in the draw-
er and maybe there was a conversation about taking the 
daughter's deed to California, but she doesn't kno\v (Rec. 
353). She admitted that her brothers Lorenzo and George 
went out to the C·hristensen place with George's deed and 
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told the tenant to get out (Rec. 355) and she admitted that 
she was a witness on the Christensen deed, but can't remem-
ber of any other deed (Rec. 356) and then .denies that she 
saw any delivery of the deed (Rec. 357). She admits the will 
of July 24, 1947 (Rec. 361) and denies that she had anything 
to do with the making of the will (Rec. 362). Denies that 
she talked with Attorney William E. Davis about any of the 
provisions of the will (Rec. 362) and denies that she was 
present when Mr. Davis and her father talked together 
(Rec. 362). Admits that Mr. Davis delivered the will and 
handed it to her to read (Rec. 363). Says her father exe-
cuted the new deeds in February of 1949 and knew exactly 
how he was dressed that day (Rec. 372) .and that his mind 
was alright (Rec. 372). That there were two deeds made 
in February of 1949, one for Lorenzo and that Lorenzo was 
not to get it before the father died (Rec. 373) and that her 
deed was hers (Rec. 373). Admits that she gave Lorenzo's 
deed on the Garland property signed in 1949 to Attorney 
George M. Mason (Rec. 37 4). Then on Rec. 376 she claim-
ed the father went through the papers and got the deeds and 
the will and gave them to her and said to put them in the 
stove and burn them. On cross-examination (Rec. 390) 
she was asked if she knew what the will was going to con-
tain. She alleged she did not until after it was made out 
and Attorney Davis brought it back. In Rec. 392 she was 
shown Exhibit L-1 which was an instrument in Marie's 
handwriting that she herself had taken to Attorney William 
E. Davis to show him how the will should be made and was 
dated July 23, 1947. She admitted that it was in her hand-
writing and said the date was wrong. On Rec. 393 she said 
it was her handwriting but the "23rd" was not and that she 
had copied that off the will after the will had been made up 
and delivered. On Rec. 394 this will was gone into piece 
meal, showing that it \vas one person writing about another 
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person's property for the benefit of a third person. She 
'\Vas asked again on Rec. 395, if she did not take that paper 
to Attorney Davis, but she denied it and said she thought 
she sent it to Lorenzo. Her evasive ability as a witness 
is very cleverly shown on the Rec. 397 a.nd 398 and then 
in Rec. 400 she was asked why did lVIr. Davis give her the 
will to read? Was it because she had been in to see him 
about it, and for the first time she started to break down 
and said "maybe so." She admitted a conversation (Rec. 
400) over the telephone with her brother Lorenzo where she 
had promised to record his deed. On Rec. 405 she finally 
broke clear down and admitted that she had delivered Ex-
hibit L-1 (the instructions for the will) to Attorney Wil-
iam E. Davis. The defendant Marie offered in E,xhibit L-c 
being a lease purportedly dated the 22nd day of December, 
1944, between her father and her husband and she acted as 
a witness. The plaintiffs' denied the date upon the contract 
and offered in their Exhibit L-2 'vhich is a letter postmark-
ed January 2, 1945, and talks about Marie and her husband 
wanting to rent property and machinery if the draft board 
didn't take him and telling that they have taken down the 
christmas tree. This was offered for the purpose of show-
ing that any agreement was back-dated. 
As far as the delivery of the deeds was concerned, the 
above is the evidence that was presented to the jury. They 
had been instructed by Instruction No. 12 (Rec. 31): 
"You are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact 
of the credibility of witnesses. In judging of 
their credibility you have the right to take into consid-
eration their deportment on the witness stand, their in-
terest, if any is shown, the result of the suit, the reas-
onableness of their statements, their apparent frank-
ness or candor, or want of it; their opportunities to 
know and understand,' and their capacity to remember. 
You have the right to consider any fact or circumstance 
in evidence which in your judgment affects the cred-
ibility of any witness. If you beleve from the evi-
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dence that any witness who has testified in this case 
has knowingly and willfully testified falsely to any Ina-
terial fact in this case, you may disregard the whole 
testimony of such witness, unless the witness is cor-
roborated by other creditable evidence or you n1ay give 
such weight to the evidence of such witness on other 
points as you may think it entitled to; the jury are the 
exclusive judges of the weight of the testimony. - - " 
In this ·case they found the witness Marie very evasive. 
She denied emphatically the very important document of the 
preparation of the will until her back was· to the wall and 
then turned around and admitted under oath that her fornl-
er testimony was wrong. She even said that she had never 
told her Dad about George selling the Christensen place 
(Rec. 419) yet on re-cross examination and when she was 
shown her own letter (Exhibit L-36) she did admit that she 
had told her Dad that George had sold the Christensen place 
and that she did that when George, she thought, was trying 
to take some ad ventage of her. (Rec. 522). 
Mr. Young says in his brief (page 37) : 
"This latter statement impels us to interject one other 
strong bit of evidence of non-delivery. The record 
stands undisputed that after signing the 1949 deeds the 
grantor went to his desk, went through all of his deeds 
and the will and directed Marie to burn the same as they 
were no longer of any force." 
This was the testimony of Marie alone. It is not corrobora-
ted. The Jury had watched and seen her testify and had 
seen her forced to change her testimony, aft·er giving it un-
der oath. They were the exclusive judges of her credibility 
and by their determination they evidently considered such 
statement to be of no more value than the statement first 
made, that she had not prepared and delivered written in-
structions to Attorney William E. Davis for the preparation 
of the father's will and then when forced with the fact that 
the attorney would be called, she changed her whole testi-
mony and admitted it. 
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The evidence shows and is uncontradicted that in both 
the case of Lorenzo and George, they actually had in their 
own possession, the 1943 deeds that were executed. by their 
father. There is very interesting Ia w in this regard. which 
is found in Chamberlin et al, vs. Larsen et al, 29. Pac. 2d 
355, Utah 1934: 
Sadie B. Bennett and Josephine Fortune were sisters 
and lived in a house and lot in Salt Lake City; the title be-
ing in Bennett. Bennett died on January 15th, 1928, and 
Fortune died March 1928. On January 24th, 1928, a deed 
was recorded to Fortune dated January 27th, 1921. In Feb-
ruary Mrs. Fortune had an accident that disabled her and a 
party by the name of Larsen came to live with her and take 
care of her in consideration of the deed conveying the prop-
erty, with Mrs. Fortune retaining a life estate. 
This action was brought by the heirs of Miss Bennett 
to set aside the deed to Mrs. Fortune, claiming non-delivery 
and that Larsen had no rights. 
The lower court held the non-delivery of the deed. The 
facts showed that Bennett and Fortune had a joint deposit 
box and the deed was in the box. Also that no entry slips 
were signed by Mrs. Fortune for admission to the box prior 
to Miss Bennett's death, but showed that Mrs. Fortune came 
to the bank with Miss Bennett occasionally. The contents 
of the box showed only papers of Miss Bennett but none of 
Mrs Fortune, other than th·e deed. 
The deed was made by an attorney who was also a real 
estate man and thought both sisters were present at the time 
the deed was made. Mrs. Fortune could not hear because 
of a slight defect in hearing. At the same time the assign-
ment of mortgage was made to Mrs. Fortune, papers and 
deed were given back to Miss :Bennett after they were com-
pleted and the assignment kept in the box, but released two 
years later by Miss Bennett who had given the assignment. 
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Testimony after deed was made - Miss Bennett wished 
to sell property. The taxes were paid by Miss .Bennett. 
Conversation between lVIiss Bennett and others - if Miss 
Bennett died first the property to go to Mrs. Fortune. 
Conversation with Mrs. Fortune after Miss .Bennett's death, 
where Mrs. Fortune does not appear to know she owns prop-
erty. One witness testifies that prior to Miss Bennett's 
death, she asked a party to go with l\irs. Fortune, if Miss 
Bennett died, to see that her deed was recorded. She doub-
ted if Mrs. Fortune knew what to do. 
Testimony at the time the box was opened, after the 
death of Miss ,Bennett showed that Mrs. Fortune got her 
deed and recognized it. This testimony was given by Larsen 
the defendant. 
Neighbors testified that Miss Bennett told them that 
she had given Josie, that is Mrs. Fortune, a deed for the 
property and all she had to do after her death was to put it 
on record. (See cross examination page 360, left hand 
column). 
In F·ebruary 1928, Mrs. Fortune was injured and called 
the doctor and tol him she had received a deed from her sis-
ter and wanted to give the property to Larsen (see balance 
of statement 360 right column). The doctor got a lawyer 
who fixed up the papers. 
See the court's statement regarding the release of the 
mortgage that had~ been assigned, page 361, where the court 
says: 
"Nor do we think that the release of the mortgage by 
the record holder thereof is much, if any, evidence, of 
the non-delivery of the unrecorded assignment thereof, 
particularly in view of the relationship existing between 
the assignor and the assignee." 
Now at the bottom of page 361 we come to the very 
question before this court. Both of the boys have had ac-
tual possession of their deeds and defendants aunlit it, but 
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claim non-delivery. At the bottom of page 361 we have: 
"The rule seems to be well settled that a deed duly exe-
cuted and acknowledged and shown to be in the pos-
session of the grantee, is self-proving both as to exe-
cution and delivery and that the recording of a deed is 
likewise evidence of delivery." 
It is thus stated in Devlin on Deeds 3d ed. Art. 294 page 362: 
"The possession of a deed duly executed in the hands of 
the grantee, is prima facie, but not conclusive evidence 
of its delivery. It therefore follows that he who dis-
putes this presumption has the burden of proof and 
must show that there has been no delivery. And not 
only must this presumption be overcome, but it is held 
there is a strong implication that it has been deliver-
ed when it is found in the hands of the grantee that only 
strong evdence can refute the presumption." 
Mr. Young is now trying to shift the burden of non-
delivery in such a way that he is willing to say "even if we 
take it for full value, that is, that they had these deeds in 
their hands, that doesn't amount to anything. They must 
prove more because the father kept possession of the pro})-
erty. The deeds were in a desk that all had acc,ess to. He 
paid the taxes. He conveyed some other property away to 
grandchildren and recorded those deeds and he made a lease 
with one of his children." 
Now back to this case. This court should examine the 
left side of page 362, where a great many cases are cited in 
support of the above and then it enters into the proposition 
of "presumption" and quotes certain text writers and in this 
regard at the bottom of page 362 says: 
"The author draws the distinction that a presumption 
of law is in reality a rule in some particular branch of 
the substantive law, a general maxim of jurisprudence, 
or an assumption by the court of the existence of a fact 
not proven in order to facilitate and expedite judicial 
action." 
And then a full paragraph follows, showing how the pre-
sumption comes into being and is applied and then says: 
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'Tested by these principles, we think the evidence of the 
plaintiffs insufficient to sustain the burden of proof and 
establish the non-delivery of the deed in question. The 
testimony of Mr. Fletcher who took the acknowledg-
ment and witnessed the deed, that after taking the ac-
knov;ledgment he handed the deed to Miss Bennett, 
did not show the non-delivery. Nor, indeed, would it 
have had that effect had he testified positively that he 
did not then see the deed delivered." Thompson vs. 
McK·enna, 22 Cal. App. 129, 133 P. 512. 
The statement by the grantor of her purpose in making 
the deed: 'To take care of any future trouble in the 
event that Miss Bennett died before Mrs. Fortune,' did 
not show non-delivery of the deed. Ehrlicj vs. Tritt, 
Supra. 
Indeed, in this respect the present case is not unlike that 
of Jackson vs. LaMar, 58 Washington, 383, 108 P. 946, 
948, where the court said: 
"A mere statement of the grantor that he wanted his 
brother to have his interest in the property in case he 
passed on, to keep him from being annoyed by the heirs 
in the east, has no tendency to establish a non-delivery 
of the deed, or to overcome the presumption arising 
from its possession by the grantee." 
Nor was the fact that the deed was kept until after the 
death of Miss Bennett in a box to which both she and 
Mrs. Fortune had access, any evidence of non-delivery. 
Reed vs. Smith 125. Gal 491 58 P. 139; Le Saulnier vs. 
Loew 53 Wis. 207, N.W. 145 Wilson vs. Wilson 32 Utah, 
169, 89 Pac 643. 
That the grantor, after the execution of the deed, con-
tinued to pay the taxes on the property, carried the 
insurance in her name and expressed to various persons 
a desire· to sell part or all of the property is not, when 
the relationship existing between the grantor and the 
grantee is taken into consideration, inconsistent with 
the actual delivery of the deed. - - - . This is not a case 
of a grant to a stranger where the grantor remained in 
possession and continued to pay taxes, etc., and we think 
such conduct is in no respect inconsistent with a prior 
delivery of the deed to the grantee, and that it is no 
evidence of non-delivery. Woolley vs. Taylor 45. Utah 
227 144 Pac. 1094; White vs. Smith Supra; Stewart vs. 
Silva Supra." 
Again we find on page 364, this : 
"We have in this respect considered only the evidence 
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tending to support the finding of non-delivery. There 
is in the record also evidence affirmatively tending to 
show delivery .of the deed. We may say, in this case, 
as was said by the court in the Stewart vs. Silva, Supra: 
'The situation presented by this appeal may be summed 
up as follows: If the trial court dis-believed all the 
witnesses who testified on behalf of the defendant, with 
reference to the delivery of the deed, there is no evi-
dence to overcome the presumption of delivery derived 
from the fact that the grantee had possession of the 
deed. If the trial court believed the testimony of these 
witnesses, it could not escape the finding of fact that the 
deed was delivered. In either event the finding of the 
trial court was erroneous." 
As a consequence the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court who had found that there was no delivery of the deed 
and directed the trial court to enter findings to the effect 
that there had been a delivery. Consequently we say that 
the evidence having shown a delivery to George and his wife 
and the possession of the deed by them at a certain time and 
the evidence having shown further, that after the father 
told Lorenzo that Marie would give him his deed and Marie 
did give it to him, the delivery was consumated and the pre-
sumption then arises that the delivery was valid and it is 
upon the party who claims non-delivery to prove the non-
delivery and the presumption of delivery will not be refut-
ted except on testimony that is clear and convincing, that the 
fact of the deed was where both parties had access to it, 
would not be such evidence. The fact that Mr. Ande·rson 
continued to pay taxes on the property would not be such 
evidence. The fact that he made a lease to one of the chil-
dren to keep them out of the army would not be such evi-
dence of non delivery. All because of the relationship 
which existed between the father and the children. Other 
cases holding this to be the law are cited under Thompson 
on R~al Property under Art. 4120 page 572 and are as fol-
lows: Stewart vs. Silva 192 Cal. 405, 221 Pac. 191; Ephraim 
vs. Oakland Title Insurance and Guarantee Co., 54 Cal. App. 
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379, 201 Pac. 946; Hodoian vs. Garabedian, 79 Cal. App. 762 
251 Pac. 227; Patterson vs. McClenatham, 296 Til, 475, 129 
NE 767; Qwinn vs. Hobbs 83 Ind. App. 263, 141 NE 812, 141 
NE 648; Partello vs. White 197 Iowa 24, 196 NW 719; Ver-
non vs. Vernon 211 Ky 196 277 SW 248; Mason vs. Mason 
231 SW 971; Clark vs. Holmes 109 Neb 213, 190 NW 493; 
In Re Cragins Estate, 274 Pol 117 Atlanta 445; Heck vs. 
Morgan 88W. :Va. 102, 106 SE 413 
Mr. Young might claim, and he has definitely inferred, 
that the getting of the deeds by Marie and delivering them 
to Lorenzo on two different occasions was not a delivery by 
the father, and then he states that Marie has denied any de-
livery to her. The jury was the judge of whether or not 
Marie was inclined to tell the truth. The father's lips have 
been sealed in death, but before they were sealed he told 
others, the Demars, that he had divided his property. He 
told his son Lorenzo that he had made the deeds, conveying 
one third to him and that Marie had his deed and would give 
it to him. Lorenzo asked Marie for it and she went and got it. 
She knew exactly where it was and it is the province of the 
jury to take these facts and hold that the father had deliv-
ered the deed to Marie for her other brother. And natural-
ly we come to this proposition, if this is a fact, that the 
father delivered the deed to Marie to deliver to Lorenzo, is 
this a good deli very? Thompson on Real Property, his per-
manent edition, Art. 4133 page 593, says' 
"TO WHOM DELIVERY MAY BE MADE IN GENER-
AL.-It is not essential that the delivery be to the gran-
tee himself. It may be made to the grantee's agent, 
and even to a third person who is not his agent, for the 
grantee's use, provided the grantee afterwards assents 
to the deed or receives it." 
And then it cites cases from the United States and Federal 
Reports, two from California, one from Connecticut, seven 
from Illinois, five from Indiana, one from lo\\·a, four from 
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Kentucky, one from Maryland, four from Mass, two from 
Michigan, three from Minnesota, one from Nebraska, three 
from New Hampshire, one from New Jersey, six from New 
York, one from North Carolinia, one from N. Dakota, one 
from Ohio, one from Oregon, two from Penn, one from South 
Carolina, and two from Texas and then a line of English 
cases. 
I ask this, did Lorenzo assent to the delivery of the deed? 
He most certainly did, he even phoned from California and 
told Marie to put it on record and she promised that she 
would and there is no testimony in the record that at the 
time she told him she would put it on the record that she 
argued or attempted to argue with him and tell him that the 
father had not delivered it to her, for him, and that it was 
not his. But on the contrary, indulged in every coopera-
tive measure to lead one to believe that her thinking was 
that it was Lorenzo's deed and that he had a right to direct 
what should be done with it. 
Another very interesting case was Robertson et al vs. 
Renshaw et al, Whitney Intervenor, Supreme Court of Iowa, 
June 21st, 1935, 261 NW 645. The facts in this case are: 
That the mother who owned certain property prior to her 
death, went down to her lawyer and had three seperate 
deeds made out to a part of her children and placed them in 
her own safety deposit box in the bank, and then told neigh-
bors that she had conveyed her property to her children and 
that the children never seeing the deeds, or having them 
delivered to them, prior to her death, but after her death 
taking the keys to her box and going down and getting the 
deeds and recording them. Then another daughter brings 
this action to have the deeds set aside. The case was tried 
upon these facts, that is, that the deeds were in the safety 
deposit box and that possession of them was obtained by the 
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grantees, after the death of the grantor, getting them into 
their possession through opening he box. There was no 
proof of non-delivery offered by the plaintiff and the court 
said on page 648: 
"There is considerable confusion in the pronouncement 
of this Court on the question of what is necessary to 
constitute delivery of a deed. All authorities agree 
that to make a warranty deed effective, a delivery is 
necessary. It is equally clear by all the authorities that 
where a deed is signed, acknowledged, and recorded, the 
law presumes that it has been delivered. (The record-
ing in this case was after the death of the grantor-
this notation is mine.) This presumption is, of course, 
a rebuttable presumption and may be overcome by any 
competent or satisfactory evidence to the contrary. 
Stiles vs. Breed, 151 Iowa, 86, 90, 130 NW RNW 376; 
Brown vs. Johnson Iowa 255 NW 862. The settled rule 
of evidence in this state is that one seeking to set aside 
such a deed, which is shown to hav-e been signed, ac-
knowledged and recorded, has the burden of showing 
non delivery by proof that is clear and satisfactory and 
this true, even though the recording is after the death 
of the grantor." 
There are a line of cases which .are given thereafter. Then 
on the left hand column of page 649 they go into the prem-
ise that delivery is a matter of intent and how it may be af-
fected, and towards the bottom of the page it says: 
"In final analysis it may be said that delivery is a mat-
ter of intent and any distinct act or word by the grantor 
with intent o pass the title to the_grantee, by transfer-
ring the deed to him or to another for his benefit is a de-
livery." 
In this case the presumption of delivery was with the parties 
who had the deed in their possession and had recorded it and 
that the court held that the other party, not overcoming 
that presumption could not prevail. This is the same as we 
have. 'Ve show that the deed was in the possession of our 
parties at different times. The presumption was not over-
come by any testimony of the defendant~, Johnsons; Marie 
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herself destroyed the deed, the father didn't. So in this 
case, the presumption being ':vith us that delivery was made 
and the intention being clearly shown of the grantor to part 
with the title and the fact that he told it to neighbors, has 
not been overcome and the jury has so determined. 
The California case of Blackledge vs. Mcintosh 259 
Pac. 770 is an interesting case for the reason that there we 
have a desk involved, similar to what we have in this case. 
The facts are, that the mother who was a widow lived with 
her daughter who was single and after going down and hav-
ing the deeds made out to her daughter brought the,m home 
and the daughter is the one who testifies about the delivery 
and no one else. She testifies that the mother gave her the 
deeds and that she put them in a roll-top desk that was in 
the mother's house, in one of the drawers where they had 
kept other business papers. When they moved again this 
desk was put in "Mama's room" which has a striking simi-
larity to the desk in question in the Anderson vs. Johnson 
case, and both had access to it until after the death of the 
mother. The mother told to friends and neighbors that she 
was going to convey the property to her daughter and that 
she had conveyed the property and they testified at the 
hearing. There was understanding between the mother 
that that deed should not be recorded and that the daughter 
could have the rents and income if she remained single. Then 
the court commenting upon this said, in the right hand 
column, page 773 
"The foregoing decisions afford ample authority for the 
holding that any oral agreement or understanding of 
Mrs. Mcintosh (Mother) may have had with her daugh-
ter that the deed should not be recorded until after 
death, and that the daughter should only have the rents 
and income from the property so long as she remained 
single and was in need of such income, is immaterial and 
would have no effect upon the delivery, because the 
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deeds were absolute in form and could not be delivered 
to the grantee conditionally. Delivery to her is neces-
sarily adsolute, and the instrument took effect imtne-
diately, discharged of any condition on which delivery 
was made, not expressed in the instruments them-
selves." 
Again over on page 772 in the right hand column we had 
something in that case that is in ours, and that is this: 
"The evidence in this case also shows that Mrs. Mc-
Intosh, after the execution of these deeds, paid the taxes 
upon the property herself, and appeared in an action 
involving one of the pieces of pro_2erty as legal owner 
thereof; collected rents from some of the properties ; 
made repairs and improvement upon another piece of 
property; made returns to the assessor for assessment 
purposses as the legal owner of the property, etc." 
"All these facts, while tending to show a continuing 
claim of title by Mrs. Mcintosh (Mother) to the proper-
ty theretofore conveyed to the defendant, were merely 
circumstances to be weighed by the trial court against 
the affirmative evidence of delivery given by the de-
fendant. These facts, taken with other facts testified 
to by the defendant and her witnesses, did no more than 
raise a conflict of evidence on the vital issues of the 
sufficiency of the delivery of the deeds to pass title to 
the defendants, and, the trial court having resolved 
that confict in favor of the defendant, such finding will 
not be disturbed by this court where there is any sub-
stantial evidence to support it." 
Again in this case the deed stayed in the possession of 
the grantor so to speak, by being in the dek in the same man-
ner as it was in the Anderson case and Thompson on Real 
Property, Art. 4144 page 604 says: 
"The fact that a deed remains in the grantor's posses-
sion will not prevail over the fact that the parties in-
tended that it should be considered as delivered." 
and they cite the following cases: Arkansas, Lee Hard-
Vi7are Co., vs. Johnson 132 Ark 432, 201 SW 289; Marvin vs. 
Simpson 23, Colorado 17 4, 46 Pacific 73, Illinois Prince vs . 
.Prince 258 Ill, 304, 101 NE 608; Little vs. Eaton 267 Ill 623 
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108 NE 727; .Balin vs. Osoba 76 Kansas 234 91 Pac. 57, Ky 
Higgins vs. Gose 144 ICy 123, 137 SW 1038, Mississippi, Wall 
vs. Wall 30 Miss. 91 64 AM. Dec. 147; Henry V. Phillips 105 
Tex 459, 151 SW 533; Thatcher vs. Capeca 75 Washington, 
249, 134 Pac. 923. And again in Thom.pson on Real Prop-
erty Art. 4144 page 608, where the delivery is complete, the 
return of the deed to the grantor does not re-invest him with 
title. And besides quoting the Blackledge vs. Mcintosh 259 
Pac. 770 quoted above, they also quote Garrett vs. Lion ·Oil 
and Refining Company 173 Ark. 429 92 SW 405; Chestnut 
vs. Cobb 163, Georgie 87, 135 SW 433; Johnson vs. Fleming 
301, Ill, 139, 133 NE 667; Burnett vs. Burnett 194 Ky 635, 
240 SW 75; Emerson-Srandingham Implement COmpany vs. 
Cook 165 Minn 198, 306 NW 170, 43 ALR 41. And this 
same Art. No. 4144 in Thompson, continues with the follow-
ing: 
"If a deed is delivered to the grantee it takes effect from 
such delivery, though it be afterwards handed back to 
the maker for a specific purpose, for instance, for safe 
keeping during the grantee's minority, to obtain a re-
lease of dower by the maker's wife, to have it acknow-
ledged or recorded, or to correct an ir.formality in it; 
delivery is not invalidated thereby A court of equity, 
on the ground of a trust, may decree a restoration of a 
deed, or, if the deed has been destroyed, it may decree 
the execution of a good and sufficient conveyance of the 
premises. If there has been a delivery, the grantee in 
trust cannot be defeated by the grantors obtaining pos-
session of the deed in any way. . Or by his state subse-
quent declaration that there has been no delivery. The 
fact that the deed was kept in a safety deposit box 
which both the grantor and the grantee kept their 
papers, did not operate to destroy its effect, if it was 
actually delivered by the grantor into the manual pos-
session of the grantee." · 
In 26 C. J. S. page 239, we have: 
"Where the grantor reserves a life estate in the proper-
ty and its possession and control, his retention of the 
deed is not inconsistent with the idea that a delivery 
was intended." 
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In 26 C. J. S. 239 we have: 
"The fact that, after a deed has geen delivered by the 
grantor to the grantee, the latter returns it to the for-
mer merely for the perfomance of some act in connec-
tion therewith does not negative the previous delh·ery 
or operate as a surrender of the title thereby acquired. 
So, the delivery is not necessarily invalidated by the fact 
that the grantor acts as a depositary for the grantee, 
as where the deed is returned to him for safe-keeping, 
or that he has access to the place where the deed is kept, 
or that it is kept with his private papers." 
In 26 C.J.S. page 247 we have: 
"Likewise, a deed is not rendered in operative by the fact 
that it is delivered under a contemporaneous agreement 
that it is not to be recorded until the grantor's death, 
(Knudson vs. Adams, 30 P. 2d 608, 137 Cal. Ap 261) or 
that the grantor is to retain possession of the property 
during his lifetime." 
The cas,e of Merritt vs. Rey, 104 Cal App 702, 286 Paci-
fic 510 and on page 512 in the right hand column we have: 
"There is now in America no legal obstruction to the 
conveying of title to real property which is to be enjoy-
ed by the grantee only at the death of the grantor. 
Under such circumstances the grantor will be regarded 
as presently conveying the title subject to the reserva-
tion of a life estate therein. Section 767, Civ. Code; 
Ripperdan vs. Weldy, 149 Cal 667, 674, 87 P. 276; 1 Tif-
fany on Real Property (2nd Ed) p, 551, Art. 159. 
While oral testimony is admissable for the purpose of 
determining the intent with which the grantor relin-
quished her custody of the deed (Williams vs. Kidd, 170 
Cal. 631, 151 P. 1, Ann, Cas 1916E, 703; Holoian vs. 
Garabedian, 79 Cal. Ap 762, 769, 251 P. 227), after the 
delivery of the deed has been adequately shown, the 
grantee takes the title free from all conditions which arP. 
not expressed therein (Mowry vs. Heney, 86 Cal. App 
475, 483, 259 P. 770; Weldon vs. Lawrenc, 76 Cal. App. 
530, 535, 245 P. 451). While it was, therefore, proper 
to consider the reservation by the grantor of the use 
and benefits derived from the property during her 
lifetime in order to determine whether she intended to 
presently pass the title to the grantee, this situation is 
not necessarily in conflict \Vith the theory of an abso-
lute conveyance of title, and is insufficient upon to 
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upset the findings of the court to the effect that title 
did not pass to the respondent. Nor is the fact that the 
grantor assumed the right to subsequently mortgage 
this property upon several occasions inconsistent with 
the absolute transfer of the title. There was no legal 
obstacle to the grantor mortgaging her life interest.'' 
In the case of .lVIcC!arthy vs. Security Trust, 188 Cal 229, 
204 P. 818, left hand column and on page 820, we have: 
"The oral request of the grantor that a deed be notre-
corded until after her death does not defeat a delivery 
otherwise effective." 
In Drummond vs. Drummond, 39 Cal. Ap. 2d. 418, 103 P. 
217. Here the grantor executed and recorded deeds to chil-
dren without delivery of them. Held manual delivery of a 
deed to grantee not essential to passing title, but delivery 
and acceptance of a deed may be manifested by the declara-
tion, acts and conduct of the parties. The Court then went 
on to say on page 228 in the left hand column: 
"When the execution and delivery of a deed with the in-
tention of thereby conveying title to the grantee is 
satisfactorily established, neither the subsequent col-
lection of rental therefrom the mortg~ging of the prop-
erty without the knowlegge or consent of the grantee, 
nor the attempt to convey it to another person, will 
vitiate the title of the grantee." 
See also Longley vs. Brooks, Cal. 92 P. 2d 394. See the left 
hand column on page 398 where the court quotes the tes-
timony relied on by it. There the grantor kept the deed 
and exercised control over the property during her lifetime 
as if it was still hers. The grantor, deceased, paid the taxes 
during her lifetime and rented the property to other par-
ties and collected the rents and attended to other business 
matters relating to the property. 
See also, Shaver vs. Canfield, Cal 70 P. 2d 507. In this case 
we have several interesting facts. The deeds were retained 
in a steel box in grantor's room and under his control. The 
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grantor passed the deeds to the grantee, and then kept them 
himself in his own box. This is similar to the incident of 
"laying on of hands" as we have in our case. The only tes-
timony in the Shaver case is by the grantee and her witnes-
ses. See the observations of the court as to decided cases 
at the top of right column on page 509. See also the Brandt 
case, Brandt vs. Brandt, 260 P. 2d 342. This is a very in-
structive case because there the question arose about testi-
mony purporting to quote the deceased as having said "that 
he was going to 'leave' his property to the grantee to avoid 
probate." The same contention was there made as is made 
by Mr. Young i. e., that this was therefore an attempted 
testamentary devise. In the right hand column, page 343, 
the grantor, after execution of deeds in question made five 
different mortgages on the same property and even made a 
subsequent deed of the same property to the same grantee. · 
The court upheld the deeds. 
In order to show that other states hold the same as Cali-
fornia, we turn to Oklahoma, Dimler vs Dimler, 32 P. 2d 876. 
This case was between a father and daughter and the facts 
are a striking example when compared to ours. The father 
went to an attorney and told him to prepare a deed in his 
daughter's name and that he was "going to deed" the prop-
erty to his daughter. Then he took the deed home and told 
her about it and that "it was for her eighteenth birthday." 
He claimed that he put the deed in a box to which they both 
had access. She claimed that he passed the deed to her and 
she put it in the box to which they both had access (his 
box). Both claimed that it was to be held until his death 
before recording. She got the d.eed when she went away to 
school without his knowledge and recorded it. He did not 
find it out until he went to have the property mortgaged 
and only then found that the deed had been recorded. He 
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brought an action to set aside the deed. The court held the 
evidence sufficient to sustain the deed. In that case there 
was not even the evidence of a sister like Mrs. Demars, who 
told "how he had conveyed his property.'' This is not meant 
to be literal, but to impress the court with the fact that she 
positively testified in the past tense. 
Another case that bears on the question of "laying on of 
hands", which lVIr. Young uses in such an odd manner is a 
Kansas case of Foresman vs. Foresman 175 P. 983. Here the 
grantor made a deed to his son, put it in his hand and Imme-
diately took it back to keep himself until he died. See the 
testimony of the wife, left column page 986, where she tes-
tified that her husband had told her that he had given the 
son the deed. Actually the husband let the son have it in 
his hand and then took it back. There is no more force in 
this than the statement made by Mr. Anderson to Mrs. 
Demars, not as much in fact, because Mr. Anderson explain-
ed in detail the proportions in which he had conveyed his 
property. He told Lorenzo in the Midwest that he had con-
veyed his property and Lorenzo advised him against this 
method and tried to get him to make deeds with a life es-
tate retained. The father insisted on his own method. The 
Kansas Court upheld the deeds. 
A very recent and interesting case involving the de-
struction of a deed by the grantor where he had possession 
of it, and on sufficiency of the evidence, is found in Chaffee 
vs. Sorensen, Cal. 236 P 2d. 851. The only evidence of de-
livery was that grantor told his attorney to make a deed and 
"give it Alice.'' He signed the deed and said "there." 
Later he got the deed among some other papers and de-
stroyed the deed. It seems that the destruction was not in-
tended but the court said: 
"If he had expressly requested it the legal situation 
would not be altered. Re-delivery of a deed to the gran-
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tor does not amount to a re-conveyance of title, even 
though it is delivered with the intent that the grantor 
cancel it." 
The California case said another very striking thing, which 
perhaps all of us have overlooked in this case: 
"Inasmuch as Chaffee was making a gift of his inter-
est in the property to his daughter we do not expect to 
find the presence of the same formalities as if it had 
been a transaction in which one person was selling 
property to another for a cash consideration." 
We believe that the .above statement is certainly· appli-
cable to ours, both as to the statement made to George when 
the deceased had George and his wife take and handle the 
deeds to signify delivery and to Lorenzo in the east. 
We want to call the Court's attention at this point 
to the fact that Marie has testified that her father 
told her to destroy the 1943 deeds. Marie and her husband 
and their lawyer all contend that Mr. Anderson was mentally 
competent at this time. If their contention is correct why 
did not the deceased destroy them himself? The obvious 
answer is that they had already been delivered and Mr. An-
derson knew this to be the fact many years before and fur-
thermore, the jury found him to be incompetent at that time 
and if he did tell Marie to destroy the deeds, he was not cog-
nizant of his direction. We do not believe he told Marie to 
destroy them. If he had done so in his right mind and not 
under duress or undue influence, he certainly would have 
either told his sons what he had done, or told Marie to do 
so. Everyone that has had anything to do with this case 
has been impressed with the fairness of Mr. Anderson. 
Even when we give Marie the benefit of any doubts in this 
case, we find that when she went to Attorney William E. 
Davis to get him to draw a will, with directions in Marie's 
own handwriting (there is nothing here to indicate that Mr. 
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Anderson gave any directions), we find that he only gave 
the Johnsons the right to buy Promontory. He did not give 
it to them. But this was not good enough for Marie and she 
kept working on ''her project" of a continual whittling down 
of the boy's interests until she got her father to sign the 
final and concluding "coup de grace." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we say: 
1. That whether or not the 1943 deeds were delivered 
by the father to the children is a legal question. The jury 
having resolved this question ~n favor of the plaintiffs, it 
then becomes the duty of this court on appeal to determine 
whether or not the decision made by he trial court and jury 
finds support in evidence. If there is competent credible 
evidence to support the finding made by the trial court and 
jury, those findings should stand. (Words used from Buck-
ey vs. Cox, No. 7730 in green sheets) . 
2. That the great weight of the evidence is that the 1943 
deeds were delivered. 
3. That the undisputed evidence is, that the deeds were 
actually in the possession of the grantees, the plaintiff's 
herein, after they were executed. That a legal presump-
tion then arises from the fact of said possession that a de-
livery has been consumated. That the burden of proving 
that no delivery has taken place is then upon the party who 
might deny delivery. That said proof must be clear and 
convincing. That the defendants have offered no evidence 
whatsoever to overcome this presumption. 
4. That after the jury determined that there had been 
a delivery of the 1943 deeds to the plaintiff's by their an-
swer to interrogatory No. 1, the answers to interrogatories 
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2 and 3-were of no value to the court, but the court having 
failed to advise them that they need not answer interroga-
tories numbers 2 and 3, if their answers to No. 1 was "Yesn 
no error was committed when they so answered No. 2 by 
saying that a delivery of the 1949 deeds had taken place and 
then answered No.3 by saying that he was not competent to 
make said delivery and execute said deeds at said time for 
the reasons: 
a. That the evidence shows conclusively that from the 
time of his first sickness he progressively deteriorated in 
both mind and body until his death. 
b. That at or about the time of the making of the 1949 
deeds he was trying to give away his valuable books, books 
that he loved better than gold, and that the family humored 
him by passing the books to the party that he might try to 
give them to, while in his sight, and then take them away 
from the party after he was out of the sight of the father. 
c. That the daughter Marie had him dressed up special 
for the execution of the deeds for the benefit of the party 
who was called in to acknowledge them. 
d. That previous to the time of the execution of the 
1949 deeds at said time and up to his death he would not 
recognize places or people, including his family or home, and 
would develop a vacant expression. That when he was not 
like this and appeared to be normal he acted abnormal by 
wanting to give valuable property away as mentioned in 
"b" above. 
e. That he told his relatives after the execution of the 
1949 deeds that his property was still divided in the sa1ne 
manner as if it was by the execution and delivery of the 1943 
deeds. 
f. That the jury believing that interrogatories num-
bered 2 and 3 had to be answered could not from the evi-
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dence find otherwise than that the father signed and parted 
with the deeds, but that he was incompetent and did not 
know the effect of his act at the time. T'his was unneces-
sary after they had determined that there had been an actual 
execution and delivery of the 1943 deeds. 
5. That this court should affirm the findings of the 
jury as well as the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment and decree, entered pursuant thereto and grant 
plaintiffs' and respondents' their costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter G. Mann 
George D. Preston 
Attorneys for plaintiffs 
and respondents. 
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